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Abstract
Credit expansion has been associated with faster economic growth
and with a higher occurrence of nancial crises, a pair of results which
seem to contradict each other. This paper advances an explanation
for these results by separating credit to the private sector into credit
to rms and credit to households. The empirical analysis shows that
credit to rms is responsible for the positive growth e¤ect, while the
higher occurrence of crises is mainly due to credit to households. The
events of the last decade, where fast credit expansion led to crises and
very little growth, can be understood as a shift in the composition of
credit towards its household component.
JEL classication: E44, G21.
Keywords: Credit; Growth; Financial Crises.
1 Introduction
Two large and inuential literatures exploring the interactions between the
nancial system and the real economy are in substantial contradiction with
each other. First, the voluminous nance and growth literature has long
argued that credit to the private sector is conducive to faster economic
growth.1 Second, the literature on the determinants of nancial crises has
Economics, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow. Glasgow G12 8QQ,
United Kingdom. Tel: +44 141 330 8517. Email: luis.angeles@glasgow.ac.uk
1 Important papers in this literature include King and Levine (1993), Beck et al. (2000),
Levine et al. (2000), Benhabib and Spiegel (2000), Rioja and Valev (2004), Aghion et al.
(2005) and Badunenko and Romero-Avila (2013).
1
shown that credit to the private sector, usually its growth rate but also
its level, is one of the most reliable predictors of nancial mayhem.2 The
profession is thus left with the result that high levels of credit facilitate
growth but rapid increases in credit bring about growth-sapping crises.
The dissonance between these two sets of results has been noted before,
but few have addressed it. Two notable exceptions are Loayza and Ranciere
(2006) and Ranciere et al. (2006). These papers study the possibility that
credit to the private sector may have multiple e¤ects, and set about esti-
mating them by using a Pooled Mean Group estimator that distinguishes
between short-term and long-term e¤ects (Loayza and Ranciere 2006) or by
considering a two-equation system where credit can a¤ect two macroeco-
nomic variables simultaneously (Ranciere et al. 2006). The present paper
also advances an explanation for the apparent contradiction between the
two literatures mentioned, but follows a completely di¤erent approach from
Loayza and Ranciere (2006) and Ranciere et al. (2006).
At the core of the analysis lies the simple fact that credit to the private
sector is actually the sum of two rather distinct elements: credit to non-
nancial rms and credit to households. These two types of economic agents
di¤er in their objectives, constraints, and behaviour. Unsurprisingly, they
also di¤er in the way they use credit and thus in the e¤ects that the credit
allocated to them has on economic growth and the occurrence of crises.
Non-nancial rms (henceforth rms) use credit to nance the acquisi-
tion of inputs and the expansion of their capital stock, activities which are
closely linked to the growth process. Households, on the other hand, are
not engaged in production and use credit mainly as a tool for consumption-
smoothing. Lending to households may be socially desirable for a number
of reasons, but having an e¤ect on economic growth is not one of them.3
2For recent evidence, with an emphasis on the 2008 global nancial crisis, see Schularick
and Taylor (2012) and Jorda et al. (2011). For earlier evidence, with an emphasis on
crises in developing countries, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998, 2002) and Domac and Peria (2003).
3The main exception to this is student loans, which are used to accumulate human
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Equally important, household and rm credit may have di¤erent e¤ects
on the occurrence of crises. Arguably, very rapid credit growth may char-
acterize periods when borrowers optimism turns into speculative frenzy.
Following Kindleberger (1978), such episodes have a tendency to end in
nancial crises as asset prices are led into irrational territory before crash-
ing down. While nancial speculation may be fed by all kinds of credit,
the above description seems specially relevant for the largest component of
household credit - namely mortgages. Indeed, mortgages nance the acqui-
sition of an asset whose supply is slow to react to changes in the market and
whose demand is almost entirely determined by credit conditions - an ideal
environment for self-fullling price buildups.
To summarize, credit to rms should be behind the overall association
between credit and growth while excessive credit to households would be
a natural explanation for the tendency of credit expansions to be followed
by crises. With this in mind, I revisit the main results of the nance and
growth literature and the literature on the determinants of nancial crises
but substitute measures of credit to the private sector with measures of
credit to rms and households.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
My source for credit data is the Long series on credit to the private non-
nancial sector, rst published by the Bank for International Settlements
in April 2013.4 The dataset disaggregates credit to the private sector into
credit to rms and credit to households using a common methodology for a
large set of countries. Another advantage is the coverage of di¤erent sources
of credit: not just bank credit but also credit from non-bank nancial in-
termediaries and credit obtained through the bond and short-term paper
markets. For the average country in our sample, 30% of total credit was
capital and could therefore be expected to have a positive e¤ect on growth. Student loans
are relatively unimportant in most countries other than the United States - and even there
they accounted for just 8% of total household credit in 2011.
4See Dembiermont et al. (2013) for a description of the data.
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not bank credit in the year 2011. I use three series from this dataset: total
credit (from all sources) allocated to the private sector, total credit allocated
to rms, and total credit allocated to households. The sum of the last two
series equals the rst one. The data is available quarterly, I average it into
annual values and normalize it by each countrys nominal GDP in the year
in question.
The BIS data o¤ers a good coverage of countries with elaborate nancial
systems. Credit to the private sector is available for 39 countries while the
data on credit to rms and credit to households covers 34 countries. In
both cases all developed economies in Western Europe, North America and
the Asia-Pacic region, plus most major emerging economies, are included.
On the other hand, the time coverage is very uneven. Time series begin in
di¤erent years for di¤erent countries, and the series of total credit to the
private sector often begin much earlier than those of credit to rms and
households. This results in about 70% more observations for the former as
compared to the latter two.5
A couple of points are worthy of notice. First, household credit and
rm credit are of the same order of magnitude in most countries. In 2010,
the average ratio of household credit to rm credit for the countries in our
sample was 0.80. Second, and this will be of relevance later on, household
credit has had a tendency to grow faster than rm credit and this tendency
markedly accelerated over the rst decade of this century. This is illustrated
in gure 1, where the ratio of household credit to rm credit averaged over
three di¤erent groups of countries is plotted over time.6 While di¤erences
in levels are apparent across these three groups, their evolution over time
is remarkably similar. In all four cases we see a slowly increasing ratio of
household credit to rm credit up to the year 2000, followed by a much
steeper rise over the rst few years of the 21st century.
5See table A1 in the Appendix for more details on time coverage by country.
6Since the country coverage of our data increases over time, plotting the average over
all available observations would introduce bias due to composition e¤ects. Figure 1 gets
around this by considering a constant set of countries with complete time series over three
selected time periods.
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[Figure 1 here]
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Finance and growth
I follow the literature and use panel data analysis with 5-year growth in-
tervals as pioneered by Levine et al. (2000) and Beck et al. (2000). The
empirical specication is then:
git = i + t + Fit + Xit + "it (1)
where git is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita in country i during
growth interval t, Fit is either total credit to the private sector or, in the
present case, total credit to households and total credit to rms (in all cases
normalized by GDP), and Xit is a set of control variables taken from the
literature.7 Equation (1) also includes country-specic xed e¤ects and a
full set of time dummies.
As is standard in the literature, I estimate (1) using the system GMM
methodology of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
taking as endogenous the credit measures and all controls. Results are pre-
sented in table 1.
[Table 1 here]
The rst column of table 1 reproduces the standard result of the nance
and growth literature using the BIS data. Total credit to the private sector
has a positive e¤ect on growth which is statistically signicant at the 1%
level. The coe¢ cient of private credit takes a value of 0:9, which is somewhat
smaller but not too removed from the values of 1:4  1:5 obtained by Beck
7 I control for the initial level of GDP per capita, average years of schooling in the adult
population, government consumption over GDP, exports plus imports over GDP, and the
ination rate. With the exception of GDP per capita and average years of schooling, all
variables are averaged over the ve years of each growth period. All regressors are used
in log form.
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et al. (2000) and Levine et al. (2000) using the same methodology but
di¤erent time and country coverage and a more restricted measure of credit.
The second column of table 1 reruns the standard regression but restricts
the time coverage to the rst decade of the 21st century. As previously docu-
mented by Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) using a more restricted measure of
credit, the positive growth e¤ect disappears over this period: the estimated
coe¢ cient is negative and not statistically signicant. This instability in the
result brings doubts over the nance and growth nexus.
Column 3 incorporates our measures of credit to households and credit to
rms. Results now tell a di¤erent story as credit is not universally growth-
enhancing. Instead, we nd a positive growth e¤ect from credit to rms
but a negative growth e¤ect from credit to households. Both results are
statistically signicant although the coe¢ cient on credit to rms is estimated
with more accuracy. Furthermore, this result continues to hold in column
4, when we restrict our sample to the period 2000-2010. Even though this
last regression contains just 65 observations, coe¢ cients remain statistically
signicant at the 10% level and do not change much in magnitude. The
stability of the result to this change in sample coverage is reassuring, and
suggests a straightforward explanation for the disappearance of the positive
growth e¤ect of private credit over the last 10 years: as documented above,
during this period most credit to the private sector was being directed to
households.8
3.2 Determinants of nancial crises
Again, I follow the literature and use logistic regressions to analyse the
determinants of nancial crises. The empirical specication is therefore:
P (crisisi;t = 1) = (Xi;t) + "it (2)
8Table 1 also reports the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation of order two in the
error term in di¤erences for columns 1 and 3 (the test is not possible in columns 2 and 4
as these use only two time periods). In both instances the test does not reject the null of
no serial correlation. I do not report the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions as the
large number of instruments renders it very weak.
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where crisisi;t is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if a systemic
nancial crisis begins on year t in country i (and a value of 0 otherwise), 
is the logistic function,  a vector of parameters to be estimated and Xi;t a
set of determinants of nancial crises. Other than the level and growth rate
of private credit, Xi;t includes the level of GDP per capita, its growth rate,
the ination rate, and the ratio of M2 to international reserves (all lagged
by one year) as additional determinants. Equation (2) is estimated using
yearly data.
Our dating of systemic nancial crises comes from Laeven and Valen-
cia (2008), which is probably the most accepted source in the literature,
extended for the years 2008-2010 using Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011). The
addition of these last three years is crucial as they incorporate the Global
Financial Crisis of 2008. Table A2 in the Appendix presents a comprehensive
list of all crises considered.
Results are reported in table 2. The rst column uses all observations
over the period 1960-2010. In line with the recent estimates of Schularick
and Taylor (2012), the level of credit to the private sector is a statistically
signicant predictor of crises, but not its growth rate. On the other hand,
column 2 removes the last ve years of data and nds a statistically sig-
nicant e¤ect of the growth rate of credit, but not its level. This is in line
with earlier results in the literature such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998, 2002) and Domac and Peria (2003). It seems that the incorporation
of the Global Financial Crisis, which a¤ected almost exclusively developed
nations, tends to shift the predictive power from the growth rate to the level
of private credit.
[Table 2 here]
Column 3 substitutes credit to the private sector by credit to rms and
households over the period 1960-2010. The level of household credit has a
positive and statistically signicant association with nancial crises, and the
magnitude of its coe¢ cient is three times the one obtained for private credit
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in column 1. Firm credit has also a positive association with nancial crises
but the coe¢ cient is much smaller and statistically signicant only at the
10% level. For both household and rm credit, it is the level and not the
growth rate of the variable that helps predict crises.
When I re-estimate these last results removing the last ve years of data
I nd no major di¤erences when it comes to household credit (column 4).
The coe¢ cient on the level of household credit increases slightly and re-
mains statistically signicant at the 1% level. The growth rate of household
credit remains not statistically signicant. The results for rm credit change
somewhat more, as statistical signicance is lost for the level of this variable
but characterizes its growth rate. While the change in the results for rm
credit mimic those for overall credit to the private sector, it is reassuring to
nd a clear and unchanging relationship between household credit and the
occurrence of crises. Finally, I note that I also tried estimating the e¤ect
of credit growth over the last 3 and 5 years instead of the last year, and
obtained very similar results.
Putting the above results together, we observe that the apparent con-
tradiction between the nance and growth literature and the literature on
the determinants of nancial crises may be satisfactorily explained. Once
credit is disaggregated into its two main components, rm credit appears
to be behind the positive growth e¤ect while household credit is the main
factor behind the enhanced occurrence of crises.
To drive the point home, I return to the estimates of table 1 but control
for the occurrence of nancial crises. If the negative e¤ect of household
credit on growth is the result of a higher occurrence of crises, we should see
its coe¢ cient move towards zero once crises are controlled for. In table 3,
crises are controlled either by introducing a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 if a crisis takes place within the 5-year interval in question (column 2)
or by using the share of each 5-year interval for which a crisis was ongoing
(column 3). Column 1 reproduces the results when crises are not controlled
for.
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As expected, the two variables controlling for the e¤ects of crises have
coe¢ cients which are negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level.
More important, when these are introduced the coe¢ cient on household
credit falls in magnitude in columns 2 and 3 and loses statistical signicance
in column 3, which uses the more accurate measure of crises. I conclude
that household credit is not damaging to growth as long as it is not allowed
to degenerate into a nancial crisis.
[Table 3 here]
4 Concluding remarks
This paper advances that pooling together household and rm credit, as
much of the literature does when considering the e¤ects of credit to the
private sector, may not be advisable. Households and rms are di¤erent
and we should expect di¤erent e¤ects. Indeed, my analysis suggests that
only rm credit has positive growth e¤ects while most of the relationship
between credit and crises comes about through household credit.
The result has a number of policy implications which future research
should explore in more detail. Much of the policy e¤ort following the Global
Financial Crisis of 2008 has been directed at getting banks lending again.
This paper puts in doubt the desirability of such unqualied policy objective
- to whom you give credit matters as much as whether you give credit or
not. Financial regulators and the Central Bank ought to pay attention not
just to the level of private credit but also to its composition.
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Appendix
Data sources: Credit data and the years of systemic nancial crises as
indicated in the text. GDP per capita, government consumption over GDP,
trade over GDP, and ination come from the World Bank. Average years
of schooling is from Barro and Lee (males and females, over 25 years old).
All control variables are available for all countries over the whole period
1960-2010 with one exception (Argentina, for which there is no data on
government consumption for 1980-1985 and no GDP per capita for 2010).
For ination we take the log of 1 plus the ination rate given that ination
can be negative. Growth rates are calculated using log di¤erences of GDP
per capita.
[Table A1: country and time coverage of BIS credit data]
[Table A2: start years of systemic nancial crises]
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Table 1 
Growth and credit to the private sector. 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM 
 (1) 
1960-2010 
(2) 
2000-2010 
(3) 
1960-2010 
(4) 
2000-2010 
     
Credit to the private sector / GDP  0.907*** -0.511   
 (0.185) (0.326)   
 
  -0.423* -0.727* 
Credit to households / GDP  
  (0.232) (0.425) 
 
    
Credit to firms / GDP 
  0.651*** 0.841* 
 
  (0.237) (0.456) 
 
    
Initial GDP per capita -1.289*** -1.889*** -1.179*** -1.083*** 
 (0.126) (0.187) (0.184) (0.296) 
Average years of schooling 1.984*** 2.933*** 1.266** 0.156 
 (0.351) (0.968) (0.504) (1.367) 
Government spending / GDP -1.530*** 1.117 -2.010*** -0.470 
 (0.292) (0.756) (0.378) (0.937) 
Trade / GDP 0.466*** 1.859*** 0.196 0.618 
 (0.138) (0.430) (0.170) (0.433) 
Inflation rate -0.644* -6.876*** -6.951*** -4.724* 
 (0.366) (1.811) (2.077) (2.691) 
     
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of observations 296 77 171 63 
Countries 39 39 33 33 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.098 -- 0.438 -- 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All variables are measured in logs. GDP 
per capita and average years of schooling are measured at the first year of each growth period. Credit to GDP, 
government spending, trade and inflation are averaged over all years of each growth period.  
  
 Table 2 
Systemic financial crises and credit to the private sector. 
 
Dependent variable: dummy variable for the start year of systemic financial crises 
Estimation method: Logistic regression 
 (1) 
1960-2010 
(2) 
1960-2005 
(3) 
1960-2010 
(4) 
1960-2005 
Credit to the private sector / 
GDP 
    
   Level 1.035** 0.516   
 (0.485) (0.746)   
   Change over last year 2.732 8.500**   
 (2.669) (3.558)   
 
    
Credit to households / GDP 
    
   Level 
  3.066*** 3.750** 
 
  (0.963) (1.578) 
   Change over last year   -7.186 -33.884 
   (8.094) (23.018) 
Credit to firms / GDP     
   Level   1.345* 2.024 
   (0.716) (1.490) 
   Change over last year   1.576 12.168** 
   (2.212) (6.108) 
    
 
One-year lag of: 
 
   
 
GDP per capita (in logs) -0.276* -0.377* -0.356 -0.913* 
 (0.160) (0.224) (0.308) (0.520) 
Growth rate 0.001 -0.090 0.056 -0.083 
 (0.056) (0.063) (0.081) (0.100) 
Inflation rate 0.001 0.000 0.030*** 0.032** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012) 
M2 / Reserves -0.002 -0.030 -0.001 -0.012 
 (0.004) (0.031) (0.003) (0.022) 
 
    
 
    
Observations
 1,163 980 696 539 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
.  
Table 3 
Growth and credit: controlling for systemic financial crises 
 
Dependent variable: growth rate of GDP per capita 
Estimation method: System GMM 
 
 (1) 
1960-2010 
(2) 
1960-2010 
(3) 
1960-2010 
    
Credit to households -0.423* -0.376* -0.218 
 (0.232) (0.224) (0.219) 
 
   
Credit to firms 0.651*** 0.769*** 0.780*** 
 (0.237) (0.231) (0.223) 
  
  
Crisis dummy  -1.267***  
  (0.240)  
Share of years in crisis  
 -2.516*** 
  
 (0.432) 
    
Controls included included included 
Observations 171 171 171 
Countries 33 33 33 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.438 0.632 0.593 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All variables are measured in logs. GDP 
per capita and average years of schooling are measured at the first year of each growth period. Credit to GDP, 
government spending, trade and inflation are averaged over all years of each growth period. 
  
Table A1 
Country and time coverage of BIS data, in terms of 5-year intervals 
 
 
  
Number of observations per 
country 
 
Total credit to the private sector Total credit to households 
and total credit to firms 
10 observations (1960-2010) Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, Greece, India, Italy, 
Korea, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Thailand, 
United Kingdom, United States 
Italy, Korea, United 
Kingdom, United States 
   
9 observations (1965-2010) Japan, Malaysia, South Africa Canada, Japan 
   
8 observations (1970-2010) Argentina, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Spain 
Finland, Germany 
   
7 observations (1975-2010) Hong Kong, Indonesia Australia, France, Norway 
   
6 observations (1980-2010) Mexico, Switzerland Belgium, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden 
   
5 observations (1985-2010) China, Turkey Turkey 
   
4 observations (1990-2010) Brazil, Czech Rep., Hungary, 
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore 
Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Singapore, 
Thailand 
   
3 observations (1995-2010) Russia Austria, Czech Rep., 
Denmark, Greece, Mexico, 
Poland 
   
2 observations (2000-2010) Luxembourg Indonesia, Ireland, 
Switzerland 
   
1 observation (2005-2010)  China, India, Luxembourg 
   
Total number of countries 39 33 
Total number of observations 298 171 
 Table A2 
Start years of systemic financial crises (for countries in our sample) 
 
Year Countries 
1977 Spain 
1980 Argentina 
1981 Mexico 
1982 Turkey 
1983 Thailand 
1988 United States 
1989 Argentina 
1990 Brazil 
1991 Finland, Hungary, Norway, Sweden 
1992 Poland 
1993 India 
1994 Brazil, Mexico 
1995 Argentina 
1996 Czech Republic 
1997 Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand 
1998 China, Russia 
2000 Turkey 
2001 Argentina 
2007 Ireland, United Kingdom, United 
States 
2008 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
 
 
 Figure 1 
Household credit / Firm credit, 3 groups of countries over time 
 
 
Country groups 
7 countries: Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, United States. 
15 countries: 7 countries plus  Australia, Belgium, France, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
21 countries: 15 countries plus  Hong Kong, Hungary, Netherlands, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey. 
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